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VIGILANTES, CLIENTELISM, AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE
Craig Charney
On the afternoon of July 22, 1990, residents of Sebokeng
watched nervously as a procession of vans and busses threaded its
way towards the African township's stadium, carrying men to a
rally called by Inkatha. Rumours of an attack by members of the
conservative Zulu movement were rife, and tension mounted during
the meeting. When it ended, several hundred local youths
confronted the Inkatha supporters as they came out. Firebombs
were hurled at an Inkatha member•s house and the two groups
started fighting, but police quickly dispersed the youths with
tear gas. Then hundreds of Inkatha men surged through the dirt
streets, breaking windows and stabbing and shooting people, until
they reached and stormed a workers• hostel controlled by
political opponents.
The 24 deaths that day began two months of violence around
Johannesburg that made headlines worldwide. Yet neither the
Johannesburg clashes nor five preceding years of vigilante
attacks on opponents of the South African state have been
adequately explained. Police and press often label them 'black
on black violence1, stereotyping Africans as uncivilised and
brutal. Academic and legal accounts have been largely
descriptive, identifying the perpetrators of particular attacks
rather than their common social bases. Why vigilantism arose
instead of other forms of repression and how it is tied to the
state also remain little explored.
This paper argues vigilantism is the continuation of
clientelist politics by other means, to paraphrase Clausewitz's
dictum on war. Drawing on South African experience and other
cases, counter-revolutionary vigilantism is defined as the
unlicensed use of private violence to defend an oligarchic
clientelist state under popular challenge. It has emerged when
patronage-based power structures were threatened from below,
preying upon cleavages within the groups in revolt. It is extra-
legal because of institutionalised, if restricted, competition
for power in the cental state and decentralised due to the
brokerage role of local elites. Current manifestations seem
connected to the emphasis on such local leaders in 'low-intensity
conflict1, the post-Vietnam doctrine of indigenised counter-
insurgency. In other words, political vigilantism is a type of
violence characterising certain dependent societies.
Analyzing vigilantism in this way means rethinking several
aspects of the academic orthodoxy on the South African state.1
In the literature, the state is regarded as ruling the black
majority by force alone; actors, ideas, and structures supporting
it in black communities are neglected. It is treated as a
developed capitalist state with a centralised, rule-governed
bureaucracy and local-level administrative capacity,
distinguished from others only by racial discrimination. Analysis
of its workings has been instrumentalist: policy processes are
explained away by 'militarisation' or seen as the interaction of
social forces in a •black box1. The approach here is different.
It regards the state in Gramscian terms as based upon force and
consent, draws on the work of Bayart, Scott, and the Regulation
School on Third World states, and follows Weber, Poulantzas, and
the New Institutionalists on the relative autonomy of politics
and institutions. This framework shows the South African state,
as a semi-industrialised African state, where authoritarian
development has rested on patrimonialism as well as racism.
It can also illuminate similar social processes and
counter-revolutionary strategies elsewhere. Historical parallels
include the Church and King mobs of 19th-century England and the
Sicilian Mafia in the 1940s. Today, vigilantes are part of the
so-called 'dirty wars1 against opposition movements in several
Third World countries, such as Colombia and the Phillipines.
Thus, while scholars have largely regarded the apartheid state
as sui generis, its comparative study can enrich our knowledge
of both South Africa and other Third World societies. The first
section of this paper explores the development and patterns of
vigilante activity, the second the social bases of vigilantism,
and the third its relationship to the state. Concluding with a
look at vigilantism in circumstances of regime transition, it
suggests that short-run solutions must involve the peaceful
institutionalisation of conflict, while the long-run need is
thorough democratisation of the clientelist state.
I. SOUTH AFRICA'S 'DIRTY WAR"
The cumulative toll of vigilante violence in South Africa
has been staggering. Reported attacks in 1986 and 1987 killed
at least 715 people. Estimates of those killed by Inkatha
supporters in Natal between 1987 and 1990 run from 2,000 to
4,000. In the battles around Johannesburg between July and
September 1990, roughly 800 more died, most at vigilantes1 hands.
By this incomplete tally, from 3,500 to 5,500 people died in
vigilante attacks between 1985 and 1990. Vigilantism in South
Africa is thus more than a series of isolated incidents,
resembling the type of unconventional counter-insurgency known
elsewhere as 'dirty war1.2
The roots of vigilante activity lay in the deepening
legitimacy and accumulation crises confronting the South African
state in the 1980s.3 These can best be understood by xomparing
South Africa with other new industrial countries. Here, as in
the others, foreign investment and middle-class demand spurred
growth in the 1960s and early 1970s, while an undemocratic state
kept labour cheap and developed key sectors.4 The tensions of
such authoritarian, dependent development, where low wages and
political repression straightjacketed growing working and
professional classes, were aggravated by South Africa's apartheid
policy. The white minority regime's disfranchisement,
dispossession, and segregation of the black majority deepened
poverty, barred social mobility, made petty official interference
a daily nuisance, and perpetuated a rigid political order more
like a colony than an industrialising nation.
The turning points came when black workers struck en masse
in 1973 and students led uprisings in 1976. These conflicts
shook the confidence of state and capital, spawned opposition
social movements like those in other semi-industrialised
societies, and halted economic growth. In subsequent years, as
political instability, inefficiency due to colour bars, and
international sanctions worsened the foreign debt and capital
flight burdens plaguing all the new industrial countries,
economic regression followed. Worried by these economic
problems, the emergent black movements (particularly the trade
unions) , and small but growing guerilla wars at home and in
occupied Namibia, P.W. Bothafs government instituted several
important reforms. It gave legal recognition to African trade
unions, municipal status and greater power to the segregated
black townships, and separate chambers of parliament with little
power to the coloured and Indian minorities, while lifting racial
restrictions on public accommodations, sex, and marriage. But
Africans remained voteless, the regime still regarding them not
as citizens of 'white South Africa1 but of rural 'homelands'
(reserves) covering 13% of the territory.5
Far from resolving the political and economic crises, the
reforms of the early 1980s laid the groundwork for the next round
of anti-apartheid protest, which began in July 1984. Boycotts
of elections for the coloured and Indian parliamentary chambers
were launched. In the grim, crowded urban African townships,
where state ownership of most land politicised housing issues,
resistance mushroomed over rent hikes the new municipal councils
had imposed to cover costs and improve their scanty amenities.
In townships of the Vaal Triangle, south of Johannesburg, the
authorities responded with detentions, house-to-house searches,
and armoured vehicles full of police and soldiers. This heavy-
handed reaction triggered off a chain of general strikes, school,
consumer, and rent boycotts, demonstrations, and violent clashes
in many black areas.6 Mass action had majority support in most,
but activists often used threats or force to compel the reluctant
to participate.7
The struggles soon spiralled from protests over local issues
to efforts, often violent, to render the country ungovernable.
The opposition called on black councillors, police, and informers
to stop collaborating. Many who refused suffered firebombings
of their houses or even death (some by the gruesome 'necklace1,
a tyre dropped around them and set alight). The tide of unrest
touched every region. Starting in the southern Transvaal and
northern Orange Free State, by early 1985 it spread throughout
those provinces and into the Eastern Cape. By August it had
struck Natal and the Western Cape. The protest movements were
loosely connected by the United Democratic Front (UDF), an
alliance of hundreds of local civic, youth, student, and women's
organizations.8 The UDF identified itself with the banned
African National Congress (ANC), the principal national
liberation movement and prime mover in the guerilla campaign.
It also allied with the fast-growing black labour movement, whose
leading forces formed the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU) in 1985. In some parts of the Eastern Cape and
Transvaal — including Soweto, Johannesburg's largest township
— the black-exclusivist Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)
also played a part in the protests.
By mid-1986, the rebellion's spread seemed to have left the
regime tottering. One-fifth of the 235 township councils had
collapsed, which, along with rent boycotts, had brought public
to a halt services in many townships. Alternative local
governments based on residents' street committees sprang up in
some. These were often tied to 'people's courts1 which heard
local disputes, where militant youths often dispensed rough
justice. A few townships were so organised and defended that
police dared not enter. ANC guerillas stepped up bombings and
raids and began training recruits inside the country.9 In these
dire straits, the state sought to shore up its coercive power.
Wghite troops poured into the townships, and hurriedly trained
black township and homeland police were rushed into duty. In
July 1985, a State of Emergency gave the security forces
draconian powers of search and detention in the Southern
Transvaal and Eastern Cape. Two months later, it was extended
to Cape Town. Vigilante attacks against anti-apartheid activists
also began to be widely reported.10
Five phases of vigilante activity in South Africa can be
distinguished since then.
1. July - December 1985: Most reports of vigilantism came
from areas outside the Emergency zones where opposition groups
were small, isolated, and vulnerable. These included country
townships like Tumahole, near Parys in the northern Free State,
where the rent protests had begun, and Natal»s largest, city,
Durban, whose principal townships fell into the Zulu tribal
reserve, KwaZulu, controlled by Inkatha. In contrast, vigilante
activity remained rare in the sprawling townships outside
Johannesburg and the well-organised centres of the Eastern Cape.
2. January - June 1986: The generalisation of revolt in
South Africa's urban townships and many rural areas was
accompanied by the generalisation of vigilante attacks.11
vigilantes laid seige to the militant townships around Pretoria,
Johannesburg, and the Vaal Triangle. Near Cape Town, crowds
destroyed the huge shanty towns around Crossroads. in Natal,
Inkatha's attacks continued around Durban and spread around
Pietermaritzburg. Vigilante activity increased after the State
of Emergency was lifted in March.
3. June 1986- August 1987: Reports of vigilante violence
dropped sharply after a second, countrywide State of Emergency
was declared in June 1986. In terms of Emergency Regulations,
police detained 30,000 people in a bid to stamp out political
activity by the UDF and unions. In this period, vigilante
action seemed to shift to a mopping-up role. In the Cape, the
focus of attacks swung to the UDF strongholds of Port Elizabeth
and Uitenhage. In the Transvaal reported attacks were rarer than
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before, though isolated cases of new opposition activity met with
renewed vigilante attacks. Sproadic flareups continued in Natal
and KwaZulu, but the homeland where vigilantism was most rife was
KwaNdebele in the northern Transvaal. There, Pretoria's plan to
add some land, declare the reserve 'independent1, and strip
residents of South African citizenship (as had been done with
four others) provoked widespread unrest. Before it was scrapped,
more than 200 opponents were killed by a shadowy group called
Imbokotho led by the homeland's rulers.12 A handful of attacks
were reported in other reserves, but they were noticeably absent
in KaNgwane, the first homeland to align with the ANC.
4. September 1987 - January 1990: When vigilante activity
had wound down in most regions, bloodshed surged around
Pietermaritzburg in Natal. With only 2,000 members in the area,
Inkatha launched a forcible door-to-door recruitment campaign
there in September. Angry pro-UDF residents foraed defence
committees and fought back, the UDF gaining ground til December.
In January 1988, powerful Inkatha strikes (aided by police)
recaptured the city's semi-rural periphery, but the UDF turned
back crowds who tried to invade the townships. During the rest
of 1988 and 1989, the fighting shifted into a war of attrition,
though knives and guns repeatedly flashed in city streets that
Africans frequented. In smaller towns south of Pietermaritzburg
and in Durban, young UDF supporters began to organise, arm, and
drive out Inkatha leaders."
5. February 1990 - present: The end of the political
logjam unleashed an intense new outburst of vigilantism. On
February 2, 1990, the new State President, F W De Klerk, unbanned
the ANC and announced the release of its leader, Nelson Mandela,
along with plans to negotiate a democratic constitution. A
vigorous wave of anti-apartheid mobilisation followed, broader
though less insurrectionary than in 1984-86, as previously quiet
townships, small towns and homelands erupting along with major
urban centres. Huge demonstrations, rent boycotts and violent
attacks on the persons and property of African councillors and
police piled on the pressure. By year-end, 40% of the black
local councils had stopped functioning, twice as many as in
1986.u Protests also helped topple two homeland governments
and convulsed several others, particularly Bophutatswana. A
drive to build ANC organisation countrywide was launched as well.
These developments did not go unchallenged. Within a month of
the ANC's unbanning, attacks by Inkatha on its supporters in
Natal reached a new peak. In March and April, forces of up to
12,000 tried unsuccessfully to overrun UDF strongholds around
Pietermaritzburg. Elsewhere, vigilantes and ANC supporters
clashed around the country. With the Sebokeng attack in July,
the vigilante war against the ANC reached Johannesburg. Late in
1990, vigilantes struck against newly-formed ANC branches in
Bophutatswana.15
From February to May 1991, as rent boycotts continued in
most transvaal townships, another succession of attacks struck
around Johannesburg, while non-Zulu township councillors there
joined Inkatha for protection against ANC supporters. In later
months, as Inkatha recruited councillors and formed branches in
small, recently-politicised towns of the far eastern and western
Transvaal and northern Free State, attacks by Inkatha supporters
on ANC members became frequent. Meanwhile, an Inkatha
counter-offensive south of Pietermaritzburg methodically won back
ground from ANC supporters, leaving 90,000 refugees and turning
two townships near Richmond into ghost towns. Disclosures in
July that the government had secretly funded Inkatha ralllies and
the Inkatha-organised United Workers Union of South Africa
(UWUSA), which became known as the Inkathagate scandal, led to
a Cabinet reshuffle by De Klerk but not to an immediate halt in
the carnage. A new outburst of violence began in August in some
Johannesburg townships and factories with UWUSA members. An
attack by mysterious gunmen which killed 18 Inkatha members
September 7 triggered revenge attacks which left 124 more dead
around Greater Johannesburg during the week before the signing
of a National Peace Accord September 14.16
There was evidence of an unprecedented degree of assistance
from elements outside the townships in the Johannesburg attacks
of 1990-91. For the first time, vigilantes frequently used AK-47
semi-automatic rifles and occasionally even flamethrowers; the
likely sources included the police or army.17 During December's
attacks in Thokoza, on the East Rand, Inkatha groups had lists
of ANC members and Xhosa residents, presumably from intelligence
sources. Reports that police failed to halt vigilantes, helped
them, or disarmed or scattered their opponents were legion.18
In several cases, vigilante bands reportedly included foreigners
from the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), long tied to
South African Military Intelligence, or Koevoet, the South
African Police counter-insurgency unit in pre-independence
Namibia.19 In Thokoza, the nearby Phola Park squatter camp, and
Swanieville on the West Rand, survivors saw whites accompanying
vigilante bands, possibly members of right-wing paramilitary
groups strong in nearby working-class white suburbs. Political
strategy appeared to lay behind a series of attacks on Soweto
commuter trains and stations which targetted 'train committee1
activists and others in their coaches, reducing once-vibrant
centres of mobilisation to silence.20 These facts all pointed
to a dangerous development: links between the Inkatha-councillor
bloc and a far right •third force' in the security forces,
paramilitary groups, and business.
Vigilante attacks in South Africa took two forms: hit squads
and crowds. Hit squads were small groups of men with fairly
constant membership. They usually struck specific targets with
fairly sophisticated weapons (guns, grenades, firebombs, or
whips). Sometimes they abducted their victims; others were
attacked in their homes. Some went masked, but the identities
of many were known.21 In contrast, crowds numbered up to
several hundred. Their members did not all know each other;
leaders brought them together. Their targets could be whole
communities, large groups of people, or specific houses or
individuals, and they used primitive weapons (clubs, tools, or
spears). Hit squads struck on both weekdays and weekends,
suggesting that members were self-employed or on duty. Crowds
usually attacked on weekends, implying they were formed of
workers.zz Both types of vigilantes were almost exclusively
male.
In the early years, most targets of vigilante attacks were
drawn from the groups leading mass opposition to apartheid.
During 1986-87, in the attacks where victims• leanings were
reported, 69% were members of UDF affiliates. The largest share,
by far, belonged to youth and student groups, making up almost
40% of the cases. Activists in civic organizations were the
second most frequent targets (17%), while those in UDF structures
were the third (13%). Members of COSATU unions were targeted in
15% of the attacks. Homelands opposition groups were hit in 7%
of the attacks, AZAPO members in 3%. However, the Natal and
Johannesburg violence involved increasingly indiscriminate
attacks against people in target areas or from Mandela's Xhosa
tribe.
While vigilantism is just one side of an often-violent
struggle for power, it is distinctive from violence by opponents
of the state. The most important distinction lies in the two
sides 'styles1 of violence. Since the fury of 1984-86 abated,
opposition violence has usually involved small groups of
lightly-armed youths, striking at specific people in minority
segments of the community. Vigilantes are better armed, often
far more numerous, and claimed many more victims, who included
whole families, areas, or townships.23 Furthermore, vigilantes
have generally enjoyed legal impunity and in some cases been
aided by the police and army, while the security forces have
acted vigorously to restrain their opponents.
Vigilantism in South Africa thus has been linked to the
nature and location of political conflict in African communities
since 1985. Its origins can be traced to the structural crisis
of the apartheid state, in which race discrimination exacerbated
political and economic problems confronting other new industrial
countries. Its appearance was a response to the vast countrywide
surge of protest and insurrection which began in 1984. The total
number of attacks has been huge, but each fits into the mosaic
of local conflicts making up the national struggle against
apartheid.et while vigilantism's ups and downs reflected local
and national tempos of political conflict, in its methods and
victims it revealed remarkable consistency.
II. THE LOCAL LEVEL: PATRONS, CLIENTS, AND WARRIORS
The social bases of vigilante activity in South Africa
largely mirrored those of opposition to the state. If civic,
youth, trade union, and women's movements led the resistance to
apartheid, vigilantism involved the local government-linked
petite bourgeoisie, elders, and patrimonially organised working
men and youth. Their role in vigilante actions reflected the
nature of support for the state in African communities in South
Africa, which is rooted in local-level clientelist relations.
8Vigil ant ism was an attempt by a class of African collaborators
with the regime to re-mobilise older types of authority and
divide those whom the opposition sought to unite.
The state in South Africa, as in most underdeveloped
societies, is a clientelist state, one where clientelism is the
principal means of legitimation and administration. In poor,
unequal societies, the inadequate resources left subordinate
groups and the state's limited institutional capacities mean it
must deal with dominated groups via local-level middlemen. These
brokers dispense favours and keep control through patronage ties
to clients in the subordinate groups. In clientelist relations,
bonds of personal dependency are based on the exchange of
essential goods and protection for obedience or labour power. The
dependents of a patron make up a clientele or faction. Though
clientelism is rooted in hierarchy and unequal exchange, it is
legitimised on the basis of reciprocity and redistribution. Such
a state recalls Weber's notion of the 'patrimonial state1.24
The type of clientelism prevalent in African states
originated in the articulation of capitalist exchange and wage
labour with the indigenous domestic mode of production. In the
domestic or lineage mode — the economy of the extended family
— male elders dominate, extracting production from women and
young men in return for access to land, mates, and ancestors.
While capitalism came to dominate production via conquest and
competition, under colonial rule resources for reproduction were
still provided largely on patriarchal, lineage-type lines,
whether real, fictitious, or metaphorical. Moreover, indirect
rule grafted state structures onto the pre-colonial lineage
system, creating a bureaucratised chiefship with new resources
and unaccountable power. Male elders, chiefs, and menbers of the
educated elite thus allocated both traditional means of
subsistence and church and state largesse. Larger clan or ethnic
units were pyramids of lineage segments. In such 'soft1 states,
individuals' ties to the state derive from their positions as
subjects of their patrons, rather than as equal citizens. Yet
the interpenetration of the domestic and capitalist modes mean
that everyone has a place in each. An middle-aged African man
can see himself as an elder and a black worker; both identities
are available for mobilisation. Two cross-cutting social
hierarchies thus run through African societies, one of age,
gender, and clan, the other, class and citizenship.25
Far from disappearing with industrialisation, the expansion
of capitalism in South Africa led to the expanded reproduction
of lineage-type relations.26 New systems of social reproduction
were colonised by older social forms. As industry drew male
migrant workers to town, they extended the rural social order
into the hostels (dormitories) with networks of 'homeboys1
governed by indunas. frequently elders in their own right.27
Urban Africans sought houses, jobs, school places and bursaries,
sport supplies, administrative favours and the like from township
'big men'.28 Apartheid policy reinforced ethnic consciousness by
creating separate urban residential zones for each group and
strengthened clientele networks by Africanising township and
homeland administration.29 Dependence was even greater in
self-organised informal settlements, where the men in charge
leaders assumed chief-like powers over land and justice with no
outside control.30 (While Africans1 exclusion from the dominant
bloc probably meant that a smaller share of resources was
redistributed than in independent African states, South Africa
was so much more developed that in absolute terms this largesse
was substantially greater.)
Inkatha, along with the KwaZulu homeland it controls,
represents the most comprehensive system of clientelism in South
Africa. While during the 1970s Inkatha styled itself a
1liberation movement' and refused the 'independence' Pretoria
offered in the 1970s, Buthelezi's breaking of the 1980 Durban
school boycotts cost him his support outside KwaZulu.
Essentially, Inkatha has become as a cartel of rural Zulu chiefs
and urban patrons. Its branches were formed on the basis of
headmen's and township wards, and Zulu traditions and rituals
were incorporated into its ideology and activities.31 New
leaders, such as Thomas Shabalala, boss of Durban's Lindelani
shacktown, were incorporated without regard to ideology if they
'played the game1. Since it controls both a homeland and big
city townships, Inkatha has more patronage and coercive power
than other (largely rural) homeland governments and township
elites.32 Through KwaZulu, Inkatha controls travel documents,
health care, pensions, education, police, and even flood relief,
while monopolising local-level resources on a vaster scale than
elsewhere. Together, culture, conservatism, clientelism, and
coercion gave Inkatha a signed-up membership of more than one
million.33
Clientelism and apartheid also formed a section of South
Africa's African petite bourgeoisie which is dependent upon the
state. Local councillors, traders, principals, civil servants,
ministers of independent (non-missionary) churches and sport club
leaders make up a tightly connected elite in most townships,
distinct in economic, political, gender, and even kinship
terms.34 These men's jobs, business sites, or financing came
from the state, and their power and profit from resources which
the racial order kept in short supply. The limited local-level
patronage these resources afforded was enough to mobilise the
cliques active in the low-participation, factional politics of
government-created township councils. Understandably
conservative, this local state-linked section of the petite
bourgeoisie frequently allied with others interested in
stability, such as police and chiefs. They were distinguishable
from the larger professional petite bourgeoisie (teachers,
nurses, mainline clergy, etc.), who were better educated, more
proletarianised, more militant politically, and predominantly
female.35
The patronage controlled by these petit bourgeois power
brokers helps explain the quiescence of South Africa•s black
areas from the 1960 Sharpeville disturbances to the revolt which
began in Soweto in 1976, and the precarious calm of the years
after. Inkatha's influence in particular is a major reason why
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Natal remained relatively calm during the widespread upheavals
of 1976. Clientelism helped contain the tensions of an
authoritarian, racially-divided industrialising society by
preserving the patriarchal rural order and extending
neo-traditional forms of dependency into the towns. While state
repression was a periodic reality, patrimonialism probably played
at least as great a role in managing African communities,
moulding their inhabitants1 consciousness by controlling
resources and encouraging unquestioning obedience to traditional
forms.36 It thus reproduced old lineage-type divisions, while
creating new ones between township factions, ethnic groups, and
urban •insiders• and migrant f outsiders'-
By the mid-1980s, South Africa's crises of accunulation and
legitimacy were reflected in the erosion of patronage control in
black communities. The limited land, funds, and jobs the
white-controlled state could allocate had been absorbed, leaving
resources for redistribution scarce. Yet the 1976 uprisings had
awakened popular demands far greater than the state could satisfy
and a degree of politicisation far too high to manage through
old-fashioned clique politics. However, since apartheid's
indirect rule policy required black areas to be self-financing,
attempts to meet the new expectations forced black local councils
to enact painful rent rises. The UDF thus was able to link local
resentment against the councils to the national liberation
struggle. Indeed, one could hardly imagine a starker challenge
to the state-linked petite bourgeoisie than that posed by the new
social movements connected by the UDF. They offended against its
conservative values, threatened the political system underlying
its patronage power, endangered its control of community
institutions, and menaced its lives and homes.
Vigilantism was the riposte of the state-linked African
petite bourgeoisie, and its dependents and followers, against
this emergent revolutionary challenge. The key role such men
played stands out across the whole sample of press cuttings
compiled for 1986-87. African local councillors or homeland
officials were reportedly involved in vigilante activities in 40
of the 49 communities where information was available. When
clientelist resource manipulation no longer sufficed, petit
bourgeois patrons mobilised men on neo-traditional lines in a
violent bid to restore stability.37
At least five patterns of vigilante mobilisation can be
distinguished, all based on patrimonial forms of organisation.
1. Members, dependents, and friends of the state-linked
petite bourgeoisie.
Hit squads usually looked more like middle-class township
cliques in arms than hired bands of habitual criminals. Their
members were bound by reciprocity among family, friends, and
recipients of favours. The core of Tumahole's vigilante group,
for instance, consisted of about 15 people, most from four
closely connected families. It started with policewoman Sophia
Koza and her two brothers. Sons of a former taxi owner friendly
with the Kozas joined them. Two brothers from another family
11
belonged to the other vigilantes1 football team and were kin of
the township's ex-mayor. Koza's lover led the group after
publicity forced the police to drop out. Other members included
two teachers angry at boycotting pupils, three students, and five
unemployed young men. Their attacks escalated from revenge for
damage to friends1 and relatives1 property into a crusade against
local activists. (Ironically, they called themselves the A-Team
after the American TV do-gooders.)38
2. Utilizing lineaqe-tvpe cleavages: generation and
territorial faction.
Generational conflict was a key base for vigilante
mobilisation. The structural tensions between adult men and
youth in the lineage order were heightened by young blacks' poor
educational opportunities, limited job prospects, and involvement
in crime. Clashes between young and old emerged when young
people assumed leadership roles in the rebellion. Many of their
elders saw this challenge to patronage politics as a threat to
parental and social authority as well, and excesses against
adults sharpened their resentment.39 Lineage-type discourses
stressing authority, respect for elders, and community gave
clientelist leaders a vocabulary which tapped into the anger of
older men against those they saw as upstarts. By emphasising
seniority in the lineage system, they shifted the issue from
oppression under the apartheid state. In Crossroads, the
generational undertones were apparent in the vigilantes'
nicknames: 'the men1 or 'the fathers'. Similar attitudes were
evident in Durban in 1985 where there was support for vigilantes
who put down youth riots even among COSATU unionists, in 1985.
Most of the 130 Inkatha men arrested after further killings in
Sebokeng in September 1990 were also middle aged or elderly.40
Competition between territorial clienteles constituted
another basis for vigilantism. In this form of factional
organisation, men who receive land from a chief traditionally owe
him military loyalty. In rural KwaZulu, these obligations were
the source of vigilantes Inkatha sent to the towns/1 In urban
townships and informal settlements, men in areas controlled by
a particular leader were also fair game for press-ganging into
his faction. Thus, before the May 1986 vigilante attacks on
Crossroads, one of the local squatter chief's lieutenants, Sam
Ndima, went door-to-door in the area his leader controlled to
round up grown men for the fight. Vigilante ranks in Durban were
swelled in the same way in 1985.42 In various townships, sport
club members subject to local 'big men1 were also drawn into
vigilante activities.
3. Plavina migrant workers against township or class-based
organisations.
Tension between migrant workers and township residents was
another source of vigilante mobilisation. In the unfamiliar
urban setting, migrants depend on the conservative homeboy
networks emanating from the homelands. Friction is constant
between them and the more affluent and politicized tovn dwellers,
who look down on the uneducated, unrefined country men;43 In
the 1980s, hostel dwellers became increasingly alienated from the
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popular movements growing in the cities. The hostels were
largely ignored by the civic organisations. Migrant leaders in
the trade unions were supplanted by younger, more radical men
from town. In Sebokeng, the Natal violence precipitated ethnic
division in the hostels, as rising anti-Inkatha feeling among
COSATU members led to ethnic tension and insults to Zulu workers
from 1987 on. Yet while they had little sympathy with urban
grievances and few organisational ties to township residents,
these desperately poor men were particularly hard hit by mass
action campaigns. During strikes and stayaways around
Johannesburg, many were forced to join in or go home, humiliating
them and leaving them angry over lost income. Rent boycotts
bankrupted the councils running their hostels, deepening their
squalor, while civic groups1 demands for the elimination of
hostels threatened their toehold in town. Many hostel dwellers,
mostly (but not solely ) Zulus, were therefore receptive to
Inkatha; those who were not were expelled from the Johannesburg
hostels during a recruitment campaign which began in July 1990.
Together, these factors explain why hostel dwellers played a
prominent role in vigilante violence in Durban, Johannesburg, and
elsewhere.44
4. Dependents or gangs hired by political leaders
The best organised, but rarest, form of vigilantism was the
private army. The most notorious was based in Shabalala•s
Lindelani squatter settlement near Durban's KwaMashu township,
set up by Inkatha's local branch chairs and KwaZulu assembly
members. To finance it, they imposed a levy on the shantytown's
9,000 households. Members of the group were paid RIO ($3) each
for "missions," such as breaking up student meetings. To
supplement its efforts, an additional 200-man force was
established. Busloads of vigilantes from Lindelani played a
major role in the struggle for control in Natal.45 An analogous
role was played by youth gangs such as the AmaSinyora, which
became a strike force against Inkatha*s opponents as its support
in KwaMashu waned in the late 1980s.
5. Feuds or communal vendettas
This type of violence is also typical of lineage societies:
where there is no state — or, by extension, where police will
not enforce the law — the only way to right a wrong is to strike
back. However, the private enforcement of justice easily gives
rise to vendettas. Harm to one member of an extended family,
clan, or ethnic group is considered a hurt which all must help
avenge, producing a symmetrical response on the opposing side.
In this way, violence takes on the self-perpetuating aspect of
a feud, one attack summoning another. Thus, in soae areas in
KwaZulu vigilante attacks have made conflicts originating in
politics into communal rivalries.46 In others there and in
KwaNdebele, previously-existing clan rivalries generated
vigilante violence by the side enjoying the state's favour.47
Vigilantism's political consequences at the local level seem
to have depended on how it fit into what might be termed the
"moral economy" of the townships.48 These values include those
of capitalist society, such as freedom and racial equality, and
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the respect for age, order, masculinity, and community
traditional in lineage-based societies. This mix of ideologies
reflects the interpenetration of capitalist and lineage social
organisation. Vigilantes sought to disrupt opposition activity
and to re-cast conflict in traditional terms. Challenges to
elders, abuses by activists, harm to members of the community,
an aura of machismo, and fear of chaos all bred sympathy for
vigilantism. Yet vigilantes also risked offending communities
by violating traditional norms of solidarity or appearing as
agents of an oppressive state.49
Vigilante activity in South Africa can thus be analyzed in
patrimonial terms, as the mobilisation of vertical lines of
authority cutting across the horizontal solidarities established
among the oppressed. It was founded on consent as well as force,
seeking to appeal to traditional values and restore lineage-type
authority. Its effect varied with the mix of persuas ion and
coercion employed by the opposition and the vigilantes. Yet
while clientelist politics explains how vigilantism occurred, it
does not explain why the state needed it. Since vigilantism in
South Africa is not just a local phenomenon but part of a
national struggle for power, it must also be examined in relation
to the nature of the state and its strategies.
III. VIGILANTES AND THE CENTRAL STATE: COVERT
COUNTER-REVOLUTION
The development of vigilantism in South Africa in the 1980s,
as in other states facing revolutionary challenges, posed a
double paradox. If the state is viewed as Weber's monopoly of
law and force, vigilantism uses force to defend the state, yet
not by the state. Moreover, though it breaks the law with
official tolerance, it is surreptitious because the state still
formally adheres to the rule of law. In other words, vigilantism
indicates that a state faces a legitimacy crisis so severe that
its structures are breaking down. This crisis, and the type of
violence to which it gives rise, reflects specific institutional
features: elite competition and the interdependence of central
and local authorities. Over the past decade, such decentralised,
informal repression has been encouraged by new counter-insurgency
theories. But in the South African case, neither vigilantism nor
conventional repression was able to turn back the mass upsurge
of the 1980s.
Competition for the votes of white citizens is a
long-standing feature of the South African state, alongside the
administration of black subjects through local patronage
networks. In the dominant group, interests have been represented
and rulers legitimated through parties, lobbies, and elections,
ensuring the permeability of the state to various classes1
demands within the framework of bourgeois and white dominance.
Though many of the country' s laws were discriminatory and
oppressive, they were enacted by Parliament and interpreted
(occasionally even restrained) by the courts. Whites enjoyed
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public services like those in developed capitalist countries.50
Such a state — a clientelist oligarchy — is not a
democracy, but it is also distinguishable from a dictatorship.
Dictatorship can be theorised as an attempt to resolve a crisis
of hegemony by change from above: an authoritarian adaptation of
the dominant class alliance and the state's economic role to fit
changes in socio-economic structure.51 In this attempt, power
is centralised in a single state apparatus (military,
bureaucracy, party, etc.) Legal limits on state action are
eliminated, elections are abolished and political parties and
protest stamped out. The institutions of civil society — the
press, the church, trade unions, etc, — are put under state
control. Even the dominant class adopts the ideology of the
ruling branch (militarism for the army, etc.). Within the state,
the establishment of a second hierarchy (military or
administrative) creates dual channels of authority, shifting
political struggle from the public scene to the corridors of the
bureaucracy. Local autonomy declines sharply, as the increased
authority of the dominant apparatus lets it subordinate or bypass
local dominant classes. Repression is the task of the police and
army, subject to central control.
In South Africa, the official response to the popular
upsurge of the 1980s aimed to increase and centralise state
power, but fell short of full-blooded dictatorship. Tolerance
of opposition and the limits to state violence vere sharply
reduced by the States of Emergency, but legally the Emergencies
were temporary measures. The institutions of civil society were
circumscribed by legal restrictions and intimidation, but
retained formal autonomy. A powerful, well-staffed executive
State President replaced the Prime Minister, curtailing
parliamentary and cabinet authority, yet Parliament, elections,
and the courts all still functioned. Security force influence
over civil affairs was formalised in a parallel administration,
the National Security Management System (NSMS). This network of
•management centres•, brought together pro-government elites,
including the military, police, civil servants, and conservative
politicians and business people, following each echelon of the
administrative hierarchy (Cabinet, provinces, regions, and local
authorities). But ministries, provinces, and local government
all still operated under the usual chain of command as well.52
Far from permitting a purposeful response to the crisis, the
proliferation of power centres deepened the state's incoherence
and favoured local autonomy. Because normal political processes
continued, the state could not attain sufficient autonomy from
the dominant class bloc to reorganise it, implement thorough-
going reforms, or abandon legality altogether. (In addition,
international hostility to racial rule meant that intensified
repression was penalised by tightening trade sanctions and
financial pressures.) Internecine conflict became the order of
the day, hawkish • securocrats' and dovish politicians alternating
in the ascendant. With no clear locus of accountability,
bureaucrats resisted orders for change. Opposition members of
the white house of Parliament, the courts, and the press
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continually challenged acts and policies of the security
bureaucracy, struggling to defend their prerogatives. These
clashes, in turn, were linked to white society's growing loss of
fa ith in the shibboleths of apartheid. Yet the factors which
distinguished the South African state from a dictatorship
encouraged informal, decentralised repression in response to the
crisis. If the centre lacked the resolve and means to control
African areas directly, this gave its local African auxiliaries
more reason to try to do so extra-legally.53
Moreover, vigilante action by local African elites against
the opposition became official strategy as the South African
Defence Force (SADF) implemented »low intensity conflict1
doctrine inside and outside South Africa. This
counter-insurgency theory, developed by the US Army and
popularised after its defeat in Vietnam, aims at indigenising
counter-revolution. It proposes suppressing revolutionary
movements by manipulating cleavages within dominated groups to
divide or win them over. A leading American exponent. Col J J
McCuen, provided the theoretical basis for the NSMS, which was
similar to command systems set up by the South Africans in
Namibia and the British in Malaysia. The structure aimed to fuse
the functions of intelligence, political and military control,
propaganda, and social upliftment, facilitating a strategy which
combined annihilation of opposition and the promotion of moderate
alternatives with the alleviation of grievances. Irregular
forces such as vigilantes are a defining feature of such •dirty
wars': McCuen calls for 'counter-guerilla gangs' and 'special
constables1 as counterparts to welfare measures.54 Officers who
had served in Military Intelligence, which developed the South
African version of this policy, commanded the aned forces,
controlled the NSMS, and ran the Special Forces units training
counter-revolutionary movements operating aginst neighbouring
countries.55 The 'security culture1, in which victory was the
only law, also pervaded the police. Most of their top officers
had been drawn from the Security Branch, extensively involved in
counter-insurgecy in South Africa and elsewhere in the region.56
The establishment of local Management Centres under military
and police control in 1985-86 coincided with the appearance of
vigilantes, and evidence of the authorities1 tolerance or support
for their activity abounded. In the reports of vigilante
attacks compiled for 1986-87, police allegedly figured in them
in 19 of 49 communities. The NSMS must have known about
vigilante activity: its management centres received police and
military intelligence and included councillors, who were often
personally involved. Yet vigilantes were rarely arrested or
prosecuted, despite frequent and well-documented complaints to
police. Within the security forces, sympathy for them and fear
of the opposition may partly explain this, but such pervasive
inaction points strongly to support at higher levels as well.
The 1991 Inkathagate scandal produced a cascade of
revelations on the extent of collusion between the security
forces and Inkatha, including aid to vigilante activity.57 It
was disclosed that in 1986, a force of 150 Zulus was given
'A
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military training by the Special Forces in Namibia, Bany of whom
were later involved in Inkatha attacks on ANC supporters in
Natal. The same year UWUSA was founded by Inkatha and funded by
the police in order to counter — and often, to atak — COSATU.
In 1987 the AmaSinyora gang in Durban joined Inkatha; its members
subsequently received weapons and training from the SADF, SAP,
and KwaZulu Police. In March 1988, a Pietermaritzburg security
policeman bought 24 guns for local Inkatha leaders, which were
later linked to two dozen murders. Late in 1989 and early in
1990, discussions between Buthelezi and a senior Durban security
policeman on ways to maintain Inkatha's shrinking support led to
state funding of Inkatha rallies in November and March, which
were followed by waves of violence.
Unlike their fairly clear ties to the state, vigilantes1
relations with to the dominant class were somewhat contradictory,
mediated by capital's ambiguous relations with the apartheid
state and the contending parties. For the large majority of
South Africa's bourgeoisie, loyal to constitutional politics
there was no evidence of support of vigilante activity.
Indeed, the desire of liberal business to incorporate blacks into
the political system helped to stymie advocates of dictatorship.
However, the failure of business to denounce vigilante activities
was also clear. Capitalists feared that the ANC's policies and
alliance with the South African Communist Party could lead to
large-scale nationalisation. Even the most progressive were
loath to publicly attack Inkatha, both because of to its
pro-capitalist stance and fear of its vengeance. While a few
business leaders in Natal regions hardest-hit by the violence
tried to mediate, most capitalists in Inkatha*s home province
continued to support it. Outside Natal, however, major business
figures such as the chair of the South African Chamber of
Business were involved the the mediation efforts leading the the
1991 National Peace Accord.
Ultimately, however, vigilantism proved an inadequate
defence for the regime. While its immediate shock effects were
considerable, over time vigilantes offended against both lineage-
type and capitalist values. For example, parents in Tumahole and
Durban were infuriated by vigilantes who were brutal to their
children and increasingly a menace to their communities. Outside
Natal, at least, vigilantes suffered from the perception that
they were tied to the apron-strings of the illegitimate white
regime. Even in KwaZulu, the limits on Inkatha's redistributive
capacity imposed by white domination left it over-reliant on
force. Thus, over time, vigilantism tended to become
counter-productive, or at best a wasting asset without genuine
social reform.
The failure of efforts to salvage the existing state by
either repression or reform became increasingly patent from 1987.
The NSMS funded improvements in dozens of communities where
resistance had been particularly intense, faithfully following
low-intensity conflict doctrine.59 Yet even with opposition
muzzled and fresh resources pumped in, the old patrons proved
unable to reassert control. Supporters of the anti-apartheid
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social movements survived both vigilantism and detentions by
retreating into the private spaces in civil society from which
they had emerged: schools, workplaces, and lineage groups. Due
to the intense disapproval the Emergency generated at home and
abroad, their detained leaders could not be held indefinitely.
As activists trickled back into circulation, the oppos ition
showed new signs of life. General strikes, election boycotts,
a campaign to defy segregation laws, and protest marches took
place, while guerilla activity and the ANC underground grew. The
evident inability of either the old African collaborators or the
security forces to restore order further shook the confidence of
the white political elite and the dominant classes in the
traditional means of rule.
When F.W. De Klerk became State President in July 1989, the
only remaining options were to close the political process
altogether or to open it up to the excluded African majority.
Closing the res publica implied a terrorist dictatorship, an
unacceptable option for several reasons. This choice would have
created a grave crisis within the white political elite and
dominant classes, for it meant abandoning the traditional form
of political regulation. The ingrained traditions of white
politics and the crisis of confidence in white civil society both
ran too deep to allow an autocratic solution. Nor was its
effectiveness certain, given the resilience of the internal
opposition. Moreover, the developed West now saw the colonial
forms tolerable decades earlier as unacceptable risks, exerting
intense pressure for their abandonment. Finally, since the
state-linked African petite bourgeoisie was politically marginal,
the white economic and politicl leaders could contemplate
abandoning this increasingly encumbrant ally more easily than in
countries where such local patrons were integral parts of the
ruling classes.60 De Klerk had only one viable choice: a
transition to democracy which would mark the beginning of the end
of South Africa's racial clientelist oligarchy.
CONCLUSION
In the transitional period underway in South Africa since
February 2, 1990, a new wave of mass mobilisation and violence
against black councillors and police has been confronted by the
greatest upsurge yet of vigilantism. From 1985 to 1990, township
and homeland elites spearheaded vigilante attacks in a violent
bid to restore the status quo. Now, the actors involved in those
conflicts are fighting for bigger stakes — power in the post-
apartheid order. The essence of a political transition is the
absence of institutionalised rules or norms. In thee
circumstances, while the contending forces prepare for electoral
combat, none nave abandoned tactics involving physical force as
well. Ending vigilantism thus implies, initially, establishing
new norms, reducing uncertainty, and encouraging peaceful
politics. Ultimately, it demands structural reform to eliminate
the social foundations of this type of violence.
18
Vigilantism is now part of the quest the collaborationist
African petite bouregoisie for a place in the alliance ruling the
•new South Africa1- Councillors and chiefs who traditionally-
ruled through patronage hope the de-racialisation of the state
to will reinvigorate clientelism, not abolish it. Substantial
new resources to exchange for obedience within their clans,
tribes, or territories could restore their power over the
masses.61 Increasingly, Inkatha is their protector and the
vehicle for their aspirations, whatever their ethnic group.
Their aims would be a regime based on ethnic patronage, either
through a 'consociational• constitution formalising ethnic
representation or through tribalist party machines. If the old
local elites can transform themselves into a conservative
reigning class like those in neo-colonial African states, they
will become attractive partners for the ruling National Party
(NP) and big business. Paralysing opposition through patronage
and violence, they could hope to enforce acquiescence to
government and capital's inequality-widening neo-liberal polices
(low wages, export orientation, modest redistribution), while
holding the balance of power between ANC and NP.62 Meanwhile,
in the smaller towns and some bantustans (notably KwaZulu and
Bophutatswana, where the old order is largely intact, vigilante
activity remains important in its fight to survive.
Attitudes and tactics the ANC has carried over from its
years of clandestinity and revolutionary struggle also encourage
vigilante action. In democratic transitions, the 'people versus
state1 confrontation generally ends with the promise of
elections, as 'the people' fragments into a welter of competing
interests, parties, and social groups•a However, many in the
ANC still expect the artificial unity of the previous era to
continue, symbolised by confusion as to whether it is a
liberation movement (representing the nation) or a political
party (with legitimate competitors). At local level, activists
continue to demand councillors' resignations and to use force
against them and police. Such tactics, are likely to drive their
targets into the arms of Inkatha, and they have not been confined
to areas where local authorities refuse to tolerate opposition,
although they enjoy far less legitimacy than when the state was
unyielding.64 Among the African public, complaints persist of
intimidation to join protests and abuses by people's courts.65
In some areas, particularly informal settlements and homelands,
the ANC has incorporated all social categories, also
incorporating the contradictions among them. Cases have been
reported where some cadres in these areas have sought clientelist
contol or become embroiled in ethnic and clan rivalries, with all
the potential for violence inherent in such conflicts.66
The 'third force1, composed of elements in the police, the
military, and their allies in civilian paramilitary groups,
appears to have continued to play a sinister role in vigilante
activity in the current period. Reports remain legion of
policemen and soldiers ignoring attacks, disarming ANC
supporters, and aiding vigilantes. Official army and police
investigations have done little to halt such abuses. It
appears that Military Intelligence and the Security Police,
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accustomed to operating as a law unto themsevles, continued with
their strategy of destabilising the ANC even after its
legalisation. Significantly, though large cuts were made in
the conventional forces budget, the funding and strength of the
Special Forces units key used low-intensity conflict actually
rose — despite an announced end to their deployment outside the
country. An additional pointer to their activity emerged during
Inkathagate, when De Klerk's order to stop SAP and SADF funding
to political groups led them to cut off no fewer than 41.
Another ominous indication of their destabilisation strategy was
the predictable jump in violence recorded every time steps were
taken towards peace between the ANC and the government, local
authorities, or Inkatha, threatening the accords (Fig. 2).
Up to now, negotiations to end vigilante activities have
largely failed. National agreements on fair competition are
difficult to enforce in a clientelist context, where power rests
on monopolising resources and organisation. Local-level truces
have tended to break down for the same reason, since a pause in
attacks does not resolve the underlying social and political
tensions. These acords also lacked implementation mechanisms
independent of the parties, making peace as fragile as the
goodwill and trust between them. In addition, the 'third force1
has had the desire and ability to undermine them, particularly
since such mutual fear prevails that a single incident (even an
accidental one) can reignite conflict. (This was illustrated
when the September 7 killings touched off a spate of revenge
attacks by Inkatha around the Reef, including East Rand townships
where ceasefires had held.) Thus it was not surprising that
neither the meetings between the ANC's Nelson Handela and
Inkatha's Gatsha Buthelezi in January and March 1991, nor most
of the local agreements signed, halted vigilante activity.
The National Peace Accord signed in September 1991 by
Inkatha, the ANC, government, and church, business, and labour
bodies, establishes far more elaborate rules and mechanisms to
control political violence than any prevous accord.73 A code of
conduct for political parties bans intimidation, forcible
recruitment, and bringing weaponse to meetings. A code for the
police bans interference in politics, including funding,
promoting, harming, arming, or training members of parties, and
a smilar code is to be negotiated for the SADF. To implement the
codes, national, regional, and local peace committees are to be
formed by the signatories to resolve or seek arbitration of
disputes that could lead to violence. A multi-party
investigative commission will have legal authority to inquire
into the causes of violence, including security force action.
Ombudsmen nominated by provincial Law Societies will receive
complaints of police misconduct and follow up police
investigations of them. The provisons are intended to establish
norms of conduct, bring the law to bear behind them, and expose
violations publicly. The success of the accord will depend in
large part on government's will and ability to bring the security
establishment to heel. While the record of the police and army
to date makes scepticism justifiable, within both resentment has









Meeting between De Klerk



















reached on related activity of
armed action, Feb 12








the ' securocrats'. In the wake of Inkathagate, the embarassment
caused the authorities by the forces1 party politicking and the
demotion of the responsible department heads, Defence Minister
Magnus Malan and Police Minister Adrian Vlok, has probably
weakened the hand of the advocates of low-intensity war. The
rules and machinery set up by the accord may further strengthen
their opponents.
However, if pacification does occur, it will result not from
a single dramamtic agreement but a process which establishes a
new structure of incentives for mutual trust and peaceable
politicsl. Members of political parties who breach the code will
have to be publicly disciplined or turned over the authorities,
not protected — or else the police will have to intervene on
their own. If the parties ae to have the confidence to rely on
the law rather than self-help, an interim arrangement for multi-
party control of the security forces will be necessary as a
follow-up to the peace accord. But physical violence against the
police must also cease if they are expected to play an impartial
role. Likewise, rather than bombing councillors out of their
homes, civic groups should draw them into local development
schemes, giving them a stake in peace. During future mass
mobilisations, persuasion and coalition-building will have to
take the place of orders and threats. For now, the best check
on vigilantism is making it a politically liability, by
controlling the comrades, co-opting the councillors, and creating
mechanisms to render the security forces accountable to all
parties.
In the long run, however, eliminating the roots of
vigilantism requires institutional changes eliminating the
colonial and clientelist character of the state. Since the
disfranchisment and indirect rule of blacks lay behind township
patronage structures, including the whole population in the
political community through universal suffrage is essential. So
is unification of the separate structures for the races
(homelands, ministries, municipalities, etc.)- Making the state
able to serve all citizens also demands substantial improvements
in its bureaucratic capacity and efficiency.71 Thorough reform
of the police and military is equally indispensible.
Beyond formal democratisation, ending vigilantism also
requires changing the state-society relationship, replacing
passive clientelism with active citizenship.7* Reducing
patronage politics means setting up redistributive programmes
that offer universal access to essential services (national
health insurance, compulsory free education, etc.)73 While
resource constraints would limit the bureaucracy's ability to
provide such services, a democratic regime could break some
bottlenecks with appeals to mass participation (volunteer-based
literacy campaigns, for instance),74 A relatively high-wage,
internally-oriented economy would also help citizens satisfy
needs via the market, leaving them less dependent upon the state.
However, the new state will also require structures able to
allocate scarce goods fairly, by rational criteria rather than
personal discretion. Finally, active voter and civic
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participation must be encouraged to make government accountable
and prevent the re-establishment of local power monopolies.
If a change of government in South Africa merely enlarges
the elite instead of transforming the state, the old patronage
system will simply acquire new masters. The stresses likely in
any democracy could then easily lead to a recrudescence of
vigilante activity, whichever party holds power. The history of
clientelist regimes in Africa and other parts of the Third World
is replete with similar cases. In South Africa, the foundations
of vigilant ism can be eradicated only if the authoritarian
clientelist state gives way to social democracy.
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